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INTRODUCTION
Those knowledgeable enough to be aware of the phenomenon are
generally disturbed by the explosive growth of federal crimes, which today
number over 4,000.1 The general public, however, has no such awareness
and, if it did, most would likely not be concerned. Indeed, the continuing
political appeal of “tough on crime” policies has been driving the growth of
federal criminal legislation.2 No one questions that government must
provide protection from crime. Rather, the constitutional question concerns
which government should protect the public against which crimes. Much
of the public seems to be under a dual misimpression: (1) that the federal
government has the primary responsibility for criminal law; and (2) that
more criminal laws translate into greater safety.3
Popular debate about crime rarely mentions the significant differences
between federal and state criminal laws.4 Despite the large number of
federal crimes, federal criminal law enforcement handles only about five
percent of total prosecutions in the country.5 The constitutional allocation
of power which leaves general police powers in the states should mean that
the federal role is much smaller. Moreover, unless Congress is prepared to
destroy the traditional role and quality of the federal courts, the number of
federal judges cannot be increased in size for the federal judiciary to handle
much more of a criminal caseload.6
1. See JOHN S. BAKER, JR., FEDERALIST SOC’Y FOR LAW & PUB. POL’Y, MEASURING THE
EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF FEDERAL CRIME LEGISLATION 3 (2004) [hereinafter FEDERALIST
REPORT] (explaining the methodology underlying the study’s count of 4,000 federal crimes),
available
at
http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/practicegroupnewsletters/
criminallaw/crimreportfinal.pdf.
2. See JAMES STRAZELLA ET AL., TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL
LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW
15-16, 16 n.28 (1998) [hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE REPORT] (asserting that “[t]here is
widespread recognition that a major reason for the federalization trend, even when federal
prosecution of these crimes may not be necessary or effective, is that federal crime
legislation
is
politically
popular”),
available
at
http://www.aba
net.org/crimjust/fedcrimlaw2.pdf.
3. See id. at 16-17 (observing that while legislative attempts to create federal criminal
laws are often prompted by the public’s “misguided[] perception that federal law
enforcement efforts are necessary or even appropriate to deal with a particular law
enforcement problem[,]” realistically, federal criminal law can only address a small number
of local crimes at any given time).
4. See id. at 14 (asserting that countless authors have observed the lack of justification
for Congress’ desire to create federal criminal law that merely duplicates state criminal law).
5. See PATRICK A. LANGAN & JODI M. BROWN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN NO. NCJ-165149, FELONY SENTENCES IN THE UNITED STATES,
1994 2 (1997) (comparing federal and state felony convictions for various crimes in 1994),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fsus94.pdf.
6. See ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 37 (arguing that a significant
increase in the number of federal judges “threatens the coherence of circuit law, risks
reduction in the quality of appointments as the degree of individual scrutiny given to the
selection and confirmation of large numbers of candidates declines, and impairs the close
working relationships essential to the deliberations within multi-judge courts”).
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Members of Congress seem not to care, or at least, not to be aware that
creating new federal crimes does little, if anything, to protect the general
public from crime.7 Some new federal crimes do protect special economic
interests.8 The general public, however, seems to feel that more federal
crime protection means protection from violent crimes and theft.9 That,
however, was not the case even following September 11th, when new
legislation primarily concerned matters of evidence gathering and
procedure.10 Regardless of these realities, too many members of Congress
seem primarily concerned that voters believe these new federal criminal
laws are protecting them. Given the mythology that surrounds the crime
issue, anyone concerned about the growth of federal criminal law is hard
pressed to know what can be done even to slow the pace.
This Article explores remedies for the overexpansion of federal criminal
law. Part I establishes that the expansion of federal criminal law continues
unabated. This Article then considers three points at which it may be
possible to achieve some slowing of the expansion of federal criminal law.
Part II suggests that lower federal courts could, as a few courts have done,
recognize as-applied challenges to federal crimes. This would take
seriously language in Lopez v. United States11 and Morrison v. United
States,12 which establishes a basis for jurisdiction in each case under a
statute based on the Commerce Clause. Part III argues that the Supreme
Court could more clearly distinguish between criminal and non-criminal
statutes under the Commerce Clause. That would focus on the separation
of powers issue of Congress imposing unconstitutional jurisdiction on the
federal courts. Finally, Part IV asserts that the Department of Justice
(DOJ) should be forced, as a matter of separation of powers, to discontinue
the practice of “detailing” attorneys to the Senate Judiciary Committee,
where they have participated in drafting criminal legislation. With
Congress unwilling to respect the constraints of federalism and separation
of powers on the creation of federal criminal statutes, lawyers and judges
might want to consider additional approaches to enforcing those
7. See id. at 20, 22 (observing that several recently enacted federal statutes,
championed by many because they would have a claimed impact on crime, have hardly been
used at all).
8. See, e.g., Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839) (criminalizing economic espionage and the theft of
proprietary trade secrets).
9. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing the limited ability of the
federal government to prosecute crimes traditionally handled by the states).
10. See, e.g., Panel Discussion, The USA-Patriot Act and the American Response to
Terror: Can We Protect Civil Liberties After September 11th?, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1501,
1510 (2002) (discussing the expansion of law enforcement’s right to engage in trap and
trace, pen register, and sneak and peek procedures under the United States Patriot Act).
11. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
12. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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constitutional limits.
I.

THE EXPANSION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW13

The expansion of federal criminal law has been well documented. As
found by a 1998 American Bar Association Task Force on the
Federalization of Crime,14 the growth of federal criminal law has been
“startling.” The Task Force’s research revealed that “[m]ore than 40% of
the federal [criminal] provisions enacted since the Civil War have been
enacted since 1970.”15 In 2004, the Federalist Society (“Federalist Report”)
measured the growth in federal criminal law since the ABA Report and
determined that the rate of growth in federal criminal law had continued at
the same pace. The 2004 report concluded that the United States Code
includes over 4,000 offenses which carry a criminal penalty.16
Documenting the precise contours of federal criminal law has proved
difficult,17 because getting an accurate count of federal crimes is not as
simple as counting the number of criminal statutes.18 According to the
ABA Report, “[s]o large is the present body of federal criminal law that
there is no conveniently accessible, complete list of federal crimes.”19
Moreover, federal criminal statutes are scattered throughout the U.S. Code
and are highly complex.20 For example, “[o]ne statutory section can
13. Part I presents an abridged version of this author’s research and conclusions from a
report originally commissioned and published by the Federalist Society for Law and Public
Policy Studies. See FEDERALIST REPORT, supra note 1.
14. The author was a member of the Task Force.
15. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 7 (emphasis in original). The ABA
Task Force further noted that “more than a quarter of the federal criminal provisions enacted
since the Civil War have been enacted within a sixteen year period since 1980.” Id. at 7 n.9.
16. FEDERALIST REPORT, supra note 1, at 12.
17. See id. at 4-10 (discussing the problems inherent in counting federal crimes and the
various methodologies used to do so). See generally Ronald L. Gainer, Federal Criminal
Code Reform: Past and Future, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 45 (1998) [hereinafter Gainer, Past
and Future]; Ronald L. Gainer, Report to the Attorney General on Federal Criminal Code
Reform, 1 CRIM. L.F. 99 (1989) [hereinafter Gainer, Report to the Attorney General].
18. In theory, federal crimes are strictly statutory, and the federal system does not
include common law crimes. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
32 (1812) (finding that federal courts lack common law criminal jurisdiction). Locating
purely common-law crimes would require consulting judicial opinions. Even then
determining what is and is not a common-law crime is problematic. See WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, 1 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 2.1(e), at 109-16 (2003). So, given that all
federal crimes must be statutory, it would seem that it should simply be a matter of counting
all the statutes which are designated as crimes. As further discussed in the text, this is not
the case.
19. FEDERALIST REPORT, supra note 1, at 4, 13 n.3 (quoting ABA TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 2, at 9).
20. See id. (citing ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 93). As noted elsewhere
in the Federalist Report, an exact count of the present “number” of federal crimes contained
in the statutes, let alone those contained in administrative regulations, is difficult to achieve
and, even then, the count is subject to varying interpretations. In part, the reason is not only
that the criminal provisions are now so numerous and their location in the books so
scattered, but also that federal criminal statutes are often complex. One statutory section
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comprehend a variety of actions, potentially multiplying the number of
federal ‘crimes’ that could be enumerated.”21 This situation presents a twofold challenge:22 (1) determining what statutes contain as crimes;23 and (2)
differentiating whether a single statute with different acts listed within a
section or subsection includes more than a single crime and, if so, how
many.24
The first difficulty involves the failure of federal law to establish a
means of comprehensively identifying the statutes that include crimes.
Federal law does not provide a general definition of the term “crime.” Title
18 of the U.S. Code, although designated “Crimes and Criminal
Procedure,” is not a comprehensive criminal code. It is simply a collection
of statutes, which contains many, but not all, of the federal crimes.25 Other
crimes are distributed throughout the other forty-nine titles of the U.S.
Code.26
can comprehend a variety of actions, potentially multiplying the number of federal “crimes”
that could be enumerated. For example, the language of 18 U.S.C. § 2113 encompasses
bank robbery, extortion, theft, assaults, killing hostages, and storing or selling anything of
value knowing it to have been taken from a bank. Depending on how this subdivisible and
dispersed law is counted, the true number of federal crimes multiplies.
21. Id. at 13 n.4.
For example, the language of 18 U.S.C. § 2113 encompasses bank robbery,
extortion, theft, assaults, killing hostages, and storing or selling anything of value
knowing it to have been taken from a bank . . . . Depending on how all this
subdivisible and dispersed law is counted, the true number of federal crimes
multiplies.
Id. (citing ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 93).
22. Id. at 4.
23. See id. (citing ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 9-10) (observing that
federal law does not effectively define crimes, and thus, administrative regulations and
penalties designated as “civil” could also be considered criminal statutes). Moreover,
although Title 18 of the U.S. Code purports to lay out federal criminal law, it does not
comprise the complete body of federal crimes. Id.; see also Gainer, Past and Future, supra
note 17, at 53 (observing that only 1,200 of the then more than 3,300 federal criminal
provisions were contained within Title 18).
24. See FEDERALIST REPORT, supra note 1, at 4 (“[O]ne statute does not necessarily
equal one crime.”). “For example, 20 U.S.C. § 9573 criminalizes knowing disclosure,
publication, and use of confidential student data. This could arguably be counted as one
offense, or as many as three offenses[.]” Id. at 13 n.9. Thus, different scholars will reach
different counts depending on how many individual crimes they find in a particular statute.
Id. at 4.
25. See Gainer, Past and Future, supra note 17, at 53.
The federal statutory law today is set forth in the 50 titles of the United States
Code. Those 50 titles encompass roughly 27,000 pages of printed text. Within
those 27,000 pages, there appear approximately 3,300 separate provisions that
carry criminal sanctions for their violation. Over 1,200 of those provisions are
found jumbled together in Title 18, euphemistically referred to as the ‘Federal
Criminal Code,’ and the remainder are found scattered throughout the other 49
titles. The judicial interpretations of those provisions, which are necessary for their
understanding, are found within the printed volumes reporting the opinions issued
by judges in federal cases—volumes which now total over 2,800 and which contain
approximately 4,000,000 printed pages.
Id.
26. There are fifty titles, but two titles, 6 and 34, currently contain no un-repealed
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Until repealed in 1984, Section 1 of Title 18 began by classifying
offenses into felonies and misdemeanors, with a sub-class of misdemeanors
denominated “petty offenses.”
Later amendments re-introduced
classifications elsewhere in Title 18.27 The repeal and later amendments
were tied to the Sentencing Act of 198928 and the creation of the United
States Sentencing Commission. “Congress’ basic goal . . . was to move the
Sentencing System in the direction of uniformity.”29 Unfortunately, the
focus on sentencing has done nothing to solve, and probably has
exacerbated, the problem of determining just what should be counted as
“crimes.” In particular, that has been a problem for offenses not listed in
Title 18, which are often regulatory or tort-like.
The second problem is that, whether contained in Title 18 or some other
title, one statute does not necessarily equal one crime. Often, a single
statute contains several crimes. Determining the number of crimes
contained within a single statute involves a matter of judgment. Various
people using different criteria are likely to disagree about the number of
crimes contained in many statutes. In the absence of a definition of crime,
the count depends on the criteria employed to determine what counts as a
crime.30
The most comprehensive effort to count the number of federal crimes
was conducted by the Office of Legal Policy (“OLP”) in the U.S.
Department of Justice during the early 1980s, in connection with the effort
to pass the proposed Federal Criminal Code.31 Mr. Ronald Gainer,
Associate Deputy Attorney General, who oversaw these efforts and
published an article, citing “approximately 3,000 federal crimes,” a number
which has been much cited since.32 In a later article, Mr. Gainer raised the
figure to “approximately 3,300 separate provisions that carry criminal
sanctions for their violation.”33 The latter number was based on a count
statutes.
27. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3581 (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 3156(3) (2000).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2000).
29. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 761 (2005).
30. The criteria primarily depend on how separate acts are counted. Where one statute
punishes several acts, do each of the several acts constitute various ways to commit a single
crime or do they constitute a separate crime for each act? In general, the OLP Report and
the Federalist Report made judgments based on whether the act was or was not a traditional
common-law crime, e.g., larceny or burglary. Every act within a section or subsection,
which constituted a common-law crime, was designated as a separate crime, even multiple
acts contained in the same section or subsection, which were not common-law crimes, were
counted as a single crime. See FEDERALIST REPORT, supra note 1, at 7, 17.
31. The proposal for a new Federal Criminal Code was introduced in the 93rd
Congress, and the effort to enact such legislation lasted for about a dozen years. See
generally Mathews & Sullivan, Criminal Liability for Violations of the Federal Securities
Laws: The National Commission’s Proposed Federal Criminal Code, S. 1 and S. 1400, 11
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 883 (973).
32. Gainer, Report to the Attorney General, supra note 17, at 94.
33. Gainer, Past and Future, supra note 17, at 54 n.8.
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done by the Buffalo Criminal Law Center, “employing somewhat different
measures.”34
The ABA Report noted that the 3,000 number was “surely outdated by
the large number of new federal crimes enacted in the 16 or so years since
its estimation.”35 Focusing on the growth in federal criminal law, the ABA
Report set out only to measure the growth of federal criminal legislation
enacted over periods of time. The ABA Task Force realized that it could
not “undertake a section by section review of every printed federal
statutory section,” which was too “massive” for its “limited purpose.”36 It
would have had to review 27,000 pages of statutes.37 Instead, the ABA
Report compiled a list of statutes from several sources38 and then measured
the annual growth of federal criminal statutes. The ABA Report did not
determine how many new crimes were contained in each statute.39 That
produced measures of the growth of federal criminal statutes since the Civil
War, with particular emphasis on the period from 1970 through 1996.40
The Federalist Report updated the ABA statutory count for the
intervening years as the basis for estimating the total number of federal
crimes. Building on the methodology used in the ABA Report, the
Federalist Report continued the count of federal criminal statutes enacted
for the years 1997 through 2003. From these numbers, the Federalist
Report used the rate of growth in federal crimes to update the OLP count.
The OLP figure, based on the most comprehensive count, was a complete
count as of the early 1980s. Still, the OLP count was something of an
estimate, as reflected in its qualified statement of “approximately 3,000
crimes.” Given that it had to employ certain judgments about how many
crimes are contained in a particular statute, the OLP count did not put forth
a precise number. The Federalist Report explained the criteria used to
make judgments about what counts as a separate crime.41 Using the OLP
figure of “approximately 3,000” and a rate of growth of twenty-five percent
from then to 2000, the Federalist Report concluded that the number of
federal offenses carrying a criminal penalty was over 4,000,42 given that
federal criminal legislation continues to grow.43

34. Id.
35. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 94.
36. Id. at 92.
37. Id. at 92.
38. Id. at 91-92.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 5-12.
41. FEDERALIST REPORT, supra note 1, at 5. To demonstrate the problem, the Appendix
in the Federalist Report counts the crimes contained in the statutes enacted since 1996. The
count lays out the criteria upon which judgments were made.
42. Id. at 3, 12.
43. Id. at 8.
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Measuring the rate of growth confirms that Congress continues to
expand federal criminal law at a brisk pace. As practitioners in the field
know well, however, the number of criminal statutes does not tell the
whole story. No matter how many crimes Congress enacts, it remains for
federal prosecutors to decide which statutes to invoke when proceeding to
an indictment. Many of the new crimes serve no other purpose than to
make Congress look good with particular groups and/or on popular issues.
The statutory provisions declared unconstitutional in Lopez44 and
Morrison45 fit that description. Many new federal criminal statutes are
rarely used, suggesting that they are unneeded. Federal prosecutors rely on
certain favorites, notably mail and wire fraud statutes,46 which they use
even when other statutes might be more appropriate.47
The fact that many statutes are rarely prosecuted, however, does not
mean that the addition of more crimes lacks consequences.48 The federal
government is supposedly a government of limited powers and, therefore,
limited jurisdiction. Every new crime expands the jurisdiction of federal
law enforcement and federal courts.49 Although a statute may rarely be
used to indict, it is available to establish the legal basis upon which to show
probable cause that a crime has been committed and, therefore, to authorize
a search and seizure.50 The availability of more crimes also affords the
prosecutor more discretion and, therefore, greater leverage against
defendants.51 Increasing the number and variety of charges tends to
44. See Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2000) (prohibiting the
knowing possession of a firearm in a school zone); see also id. § 922(q)(1) (enumerating
Congress’s jurisdictional findings).
45. See Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000) (establishing a federal
cause of action for gender-motivated crimes of violence).
46. See Mail Fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000) (criminalizing mail frauds and swindles);
id. § 1343 (criminalizing fraud by wire, radio, or television).
47. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Maybe It Should Just Be Called Federal Fraud: The
Changing Nature of the Mail Fraud Statute, 36 B.C. L. REV. 435, 437-38 (1995) (discussing
the broad reach of the federal mail and wire fraud statutes to prosecute crimes that were
traditionally dealt with at the state level).
48. FEDERALIST REPORT, supra note 1, at 9; see also ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 2, at 24-43 (discussing the adverse effects of the federalization of crime, even though
many of the crimes are rarely prosecuted). The ABA Task Force lists several adverse
consequences, including: (1) undermining the constitutionally-established role of the states
as the primary enforcers of criminal law; (2) expanding “federal investigative power”; and
(3) establishing a dual criminal justice system where the same conduct is subject to differing
criminal penalties at the state and federal levels. Id. at 26-31.
49. See FEDERALIST REPORT, supra note 1, at 9; see, e.g., Renee M. Landers,
Legislating Federal Crime and Its Consequences: Prosecutorial Limits on Overlapping
Federal and State Jurisdiction, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 64, 65 (1996)
(noting that many of the statutes recently enacted by Congress “expand federal court
jurisdiction into areas previously the sole responsibility of the states”).
50. FEDERALIST REPORT, supra note 1, at 9.
51. Id. (“Increasing the number and variety of charges tends to dissuade defendants
from fighting the charges, because [they] can usually be ‘clipped’ for something.”); see,
e.g., R. Barry Ruback & Jonathan Wroblewski, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
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dissuade defendants from fighting the charges, because they usually can be
“clipped” for something.
Finally, no count of crimes in the statutes takes account of the expansion
of federal criminal law that occurs without new legislation. Federal
prosecutors regularly stretch the application of existing statutes.52
Consider, for example, the prosecution of Arthur Andersen LLP, the appeal
of which the Supreme Court granted certiorari.53 As in United States v.
Arthur Andersen, LLP, federal courts often cooperate with prosecutors and
make new law retroactively.54 What (then) Professor and (later federal
Judge) John Noonan wrote in 1984 about bribery and public corruption
continues to be generally true, namely that federal prosecutors and federal
judges have been effectively creating a common law of crimes through
expansive interpretations.55
II. AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES TO JURISDICTION BASED ON THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE
In order to enforce limits on the federalization of crime, Lopez56 and
Morrison57 have articulated an analytic framework for determining when
Congress exceeds its power under the Commerce Clause.58 That
framework assumes the availability of as-applied challenges to facially
valid federal crimes enacted under the Commerce Clause. A few appellate
decisions, most notably United States v. Stewart,59 have recognized such
Psychological and Policy Reasons for Simplification, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 739, 749
(2001) (claiming that “prosecutors can, and often do, manipulate the number of charges
against a defendant as a way to pressure him or her into agreeing to a plea bargain”).
52. FEDERALIST REPORT, supra note 1, at 10.
53. See United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 374 F.3d 281, 302 (5th Cir. 2004)
(affirming the conviction of Arthur Anderson, LLP for obstructing Securities and Exchange
Commission proceedings), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 823 (2005); see also John S. Baker, Jr.,
An Injustice in Houston, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2002, at A16 [hereinafter Baker, Jr. Injustice]
(arguing that U.S. District Judge Harmon made “new law as to the proof required on the
critical element” of the crime in the Arthur Andersen prosecution when “she gave the jury a
very debatable interpretation” of the law “at the request of the Justice Department”).
54. See Baker, Jr., Injustice, supra note 53 (discussing the dangers of federal judges and
federal prosecutors making new law outside of the legislative process). “[A]s the Supreme
Court long ago held, but has since often ignored, federal judges do not have the power to
create new crimes; only Congress can do so.” Id. Moreover, the Ex Post Facto Clause of
the Constitution would have prevented Congress from stretching the law as Judge Harmon
did retroactively in Andersen. Id.
55. FEDERALIST REPORT, supra note 1, at 10; see also JOHN NOONAN, BRIBES 585-86,
620 (1984) (contending that “broad federal statutes and judicial self-confidence” have
effectively removed the two-century-old black letter law that there is no federal common
law of crimes).
56. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
57. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
58. See id. at 608 (observing that under the Commerce Clause, Congress exercises
legislative authority over “‘three broad categories of activity’”) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at
558).
59. 348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003).
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as-applied challenges.60 As suggested by the analytic framework of Lopez
and Morrison, not only Congress, but also federal prosecutors, must
establish that the prohibited activity falls within the limits of the Commerce
Clause.
A. The Analytic Framework of Lopez and Morrison
In this Supreme Court term, in Ashcroft v. Raich,61 the Court is
considering a challenge to a federal criminal prohibition on the use of
home-grown marijuana, permitted under California law for medical use.62
Raich requires the Court to revisit the framework developed in Lopez and
Morrison in a situation much closer to Wickard v. Filburn63 than either of
the prior two cases. Wickard allows Congress to regulate local commerce
that, aggregated together, “substantially affects” interstate commerce.64
The interpretation of that principle lies at the heart of Lopez and Morrison.
The analytic framework begins with the proposition that, under the
Commerce Clause, Congress may regulate three broad categories: (1) “the
channels of interstate commerce”; (2) “instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce”; and (3) “activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce.”65 Both Lopez and Morrison
involve the third category.66 Both cases reject the argument that the
situation should be governed by Wickard’s cumulative effects principle.67
Accordingly, they consider factors which cabin the cumulative effects
principle.
Lopez observes that the Gun-Free School Zones Act68 “by its terms has
nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise,” and

60. See id. at 1141-42 (“[D]eterminations that statutes are facially invalid properly
occur only as logical outgrowths of rulings on whether statutes may be applied to particular
litigants on particular facts.”) (quoting Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial
Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1327-28 (2000)).
61. 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 2909 (2004).
62. See id. at 1234. In Raich, the Ninth Circuit ordered the entry of a preliminary
injunction prohibiting the federal government from enforcing the Controlled Substances Act
against the plaintiffs after finding that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits of
their claim. Id.
63. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
64. Id. at 125 (“[E]ven if [the] activity [is] local and though it may not be regarded as
commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce.”).
65. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
66. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000) (noting that Congress
justified the civil remedy provisions of the Violence Against Women Act as a regulation of
activity substantially affecting interstate commerce); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 (finding that
the Gun-Free School Zones Act did not seek to regulate the channels or instrumentalities of
interstate commerce or persons or things in interstate commerce).
67. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
68. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (2000).
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thus is not governed by the aggregation principle.69 The second point, and
the most important for present purposes as elaborated below, concerns
jurisdiction. Finally, the opinion discusses the lack of any congressional
findings, which might have compensated for the failure to include a
jurisdictional element.70
Regardless of whether congressional findings save the facial
constitutionality of a federal crime which lacks a jurisdictional element,
Lopez requires a “case-by-case inquiry” regarding jurisdiction.71 The Court
emphasized this point:
For example, in United States v. Bass, . . . the Court interpreted former
18 U.S.C. § 1202(a), which made it a crime for a felon to ‘receive[e],
posses[s], or transport[t] in commerce or affecting commerce . . . any
firearm.’ . . . The Court interpreted the possession component of §
1202(a) to require an additional nexus to interstate commerce both
because the statute was ambiguous and because ‘unless Congress
conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly
changed the federal-state balance.’ . . . The Bass Court set aside the
conviction because, although the Government had demonstrated that
Bass had possessed a firearm, it had failed ‘to show the requisite nexus
with interstate commerce.’72

The Court distinguished proof of jurisdiction in the particular case from the
overall constitutionality of the statute.
The Court thus interpreted the statute to reserve the constitutional
question whether Congress could regulate, without more, the ‘mere
possession’ of firearms . . . ‘The principle is old and deeply imbedded in
our jurisprudence that this Court will construe a statute in a manner that
requires decision of serious constitutional questions only if the statutory
language leaves no reasonable alternative’ . . . Unlike the statute in Bass,
§ 922(q) has no express jurisdictional element which might limit its
reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an
explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce.73

Morrison elaborated the three points covered in Lopez into four factors.74
It considered whether: (1) the activity at which the statute is directed is
commercial or economic in nature;75 (2) the statute contains an express
69. 514 U.S. at 561.
70. See id. at 562-63 (noting Congress’s failure to discuss its legislative judgment as to
how the regulated activity affects interstate commerce).
71. See id. at 561 (“[Section] 922(q) contains no jurisdictional element which would
ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects
interstate commerce.”).
72. Id. at 561-62 (emphasis added and internal citations omitted).
73. Id. at 562 (emphasis added and internal citations omitted).
74. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610-13 (2000) (reflecting on the main
points that the Court considered in its Lopez decision).
75. Id. at 610-11.
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jurisdictional element involving interstate activity that might limit its
reach;76 (3) Congress has made specific findings regarding the effects of
the prohibited activity on interstate commerce;77 and (4) the link between
the prohibited conduct and its purported substantial effect on interstate
commerce is attenuated.78 The fourth factor reiterated Lopez’s rejection of
the “but-for” reasoning about the “costs of crime” and “national
productivity” arguments put forth by the dissent.79 Like the first factor, the
fourth represented a containment of Wickard.80
Morrison held that the Commerce Clause did not provide Congress with
the authority to enact the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against
Women Act.81 First, the provision was not a regulation of activity that
substantially affects interstate commerce.82
Second, it lacked a
jurisdictional requirement.83 Third, even though Congress had made
factual findings regarding jurisdiction, these findings did not save the
statute’s constitutionality.84 The Court did not specifically discuss the
fourth factor, attenuation, but that factor was reflected in the references
rejecting “but for reasoning”85 and “aggregate effect” reasoning.86
B. Jurisdiction and As-Applied Challenges
The availability of as-applied challenges is often overlooked, as recently
illustrated by the opinions in United States v. Booker—a case dealing with

76. Id. at 611-12.
77. Id. at 612.
78. Id. at 612-13.
79. See id. at 612-13 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995)); see
also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 619-24 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
80. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-18 (acknowledging that intrastate violence may have
an effect on interstate commerce but noting that regulation of violent crime has always been
a function of the state’s police power and concluding that Congress may not regulate
“noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on
interstate commerce”); see also Bradford C. Mank, Can Congress Regulate Interstate
Endangered Species Under the Commerce Clause? The Split in the Circuits Over Whether
the Regulated Activity is Private Commercial Development or the Taking of a Protected
Species, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 923, 947 (2004) (noting that Morrison and Lopez limited
Wickard’s aggregation theory to economic activities).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
82. 529 U.S. at 613.
83. Id. at 611-12 (“Such a jurisdictional element may establish that the enactment is in
pursuance of Congress’s regulation of interstate commerce.”).
84. Id. at 614-15 (“Congress’ findings are substantially weakened by the fact that they
rely so heavily on a method of reasoning that we have already rejected as unworkable if we
are to maintain the Constitution’s enumeration of powers.”).
85. Id. at 615-16 (“The reasoning that petitioners advance seeks to follow the but-for
causal chain from the initial occurrence of violent crime . . . to every attenuated effect upon
interstate commerce.”).
86. Id. at 617 (rejecting “the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic,
violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate
commerce”).
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sentencing guidelines.87 After a majority of the Supreme Court declared
sentencing enhancements based on judge fact-finding a violation of the
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial,88 a different majority declared two
sections of the guidelines unconstitutional.89 Justice Thomas, dissenting on
the remedy, argued that the Court should have adhered to its usual practice
of rendering only an as-applied ruling.90 The other dissenters on the
remedy also argued that this case did not call for a ruling of facial
unconstitutionality.91 Both dissents made the point that, under the Court’s
jurisprudence, the unconstitutionality of the specific application does not
mean that the statute (or any part of it) is facially unconstitutional.92
Conversely, it would follow that the fact that a statute is facially
constitutional does not preclude the possibility that particular applications
will be unconstitutional.
The most familiar examples of the distinction between facial and asapplied challenges occur under the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines,
usually in the context of speech.93 The standard for facial challenges on
vagueness grounds is a matter of dispute within the Supreme Court.94
87. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
88. Id. at 756 (Stevens, J., with Scalia, Souter, Thomas & Ginsburg, JJ., constituting the
majority as to the constitutional question) (requiring that all facts that affect sentencing “be
admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt”).
89. Id. at 764 (Breyer, J., with Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor, Kennedy & Ginsburg, JJ.,
constituting the majority as to the remedy) (invalidating the provisions of the federal
sentencing guidelines “that require[] sentencing courts to impose a sentence within the
applicable Guidelines range” and “that set[] forth standards of review on appeal, including
de novo review of departures from the applicable Guidelines range”).
90. Id. at 795 (Thomas, J., dissenting as to the remedy) (maintaining that when a
particular application of a statute is unconstitutional, but the statute itself is not, the Court
typically invalidates only the application and not the statute itself). According to Justice
Thomas: “Absent an exception such as First Amendment overbreadth, we will facially
invalidate a statute only if the plaintiff establishes that the statute is invalid in all of its
applications.” Id. (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).
91. Id. at 777 (Stevens, J., with Souter, J., dissenting as to the remedy, joined by Scalia,
J., except for Part III and footnote 17). “Neither section is unconstitutional. While these
provisions can in certain cases, when combined with other statutory and Guidelines
provisions, result in a violation of the Sixth Amendment, they are plainly constitutional on
their faces.” Id.
92. See id. at 795 (Thomas, J., dissenting as to the remedy) (noting that where the
statute is unconstitutional “as applied,” the statute is struck down only as it applies to a
specific litigant, not on its face); id. at 777 (Stevens, J., with Souter, J., dissenting as to the
remedy, joined by Scalia, J., except for Part III and footnote 17) (stating that while the
statutory provisions could violate the Sixth Amendment, those provisions remain facially
constitutional).
93. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1022-1039
(2d ed. 1988) (providing that “overbreadth analysis . . . compares the statutory line defining
burdened and unburdened conduct with the judicial line specifying activities protected and
unprotected by the First Amendment”).
94. Compare Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 (maintaining that to succeed on a facial
challenge, “the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the
Act would be valid”), and City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 796 (1984) (stating that a statute is facially invalid if “it is unconstitutional in every
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Nevertheless, in order for a plaintiff to secure either an as-applied or a
facial ruling, the statute must be unconstitutional as applied to the
plaintiff.95 Overbreadth challenges, on the other hand, depart from the
normal rule.96 Such challenges need only establish that the statute suffers
from substantial overbreadth.97 Indeed, successful challenges often cannot
establish that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to the specific
plaintiff.98
As for the Commerce Clause, an as-applied challenge might appear to be
at odds with Wickard, in which the point seemed to be that the individual
activity by itself did not fall within the scope of the Commerce Clause.99
Wickard, a non-criminal case, rests on the “market concept”—specifically
in that case a national market for wheat.100 As discussed above, the
Lopez/Morrison framework explicitly makes the “aggregation” or
“cumulative effects” principle generally inapplicable to criminal cases.101
As Morrison observes: “While we need not adopt a categorical rule against
aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these
cases, thus far in our Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce
Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic
in nature.”102 So even if Raich applies Wickard’s market aggregation
principle to home-grown marijuana as having a “substantial effect” on a
national market for marijuana, that would have no impact on the validity of
as-applied challenges to crimes involving non-economic activity.
conceivable application”), with City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 n.22 (1999)
(“To the extent we have consistently articulated a clear standard for facial challenges, it is
not the Salerno formulation, which has never been a decisive factor in any decision of this
Court . . . .”). See also Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 773 n.1 (Stevens, J., with Souter, J., dissenting
as to the remedy, joined by Scalia, J., except for Part III and footnote 17) (noting that the
Court continues to debate the proper standard for facial challenges).
95. See TRIBE, supra note 93, at 1036 (reporting that a party asserting unconstitutional
vagueness must either demonstrate that the challenged statute is vague as applied to the
particular party or vague as applied to everyone) (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 75358 (1974)).
96. Id. at 1035 (“Overbreadth analysis is often perceived as an exception to the rule that
an individual is not ordinarily permitted to litigate the rights of third parties . . . .”).
97. Id. at 1024.
98. See id. at 1035 (“Those whose expression is ‘chilled’ by the existence of an
overbroad or unduly vague statute cannot be expected to adjudicate their own rights, lacking
by definition the willingness to disobey the law.”) (citing Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518,
521 (1972)).
99. See 317 U.S. 111, 124, 127-28 (1942) (“That appellee’s own contribution to the
demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove [his conduct] from the
scope of federal regulation.”).
100. Id. at 125-29 (justifying regulation of wheat under Congress’s commerce power
with the explanation that a national market for wheat exists, and that even “wheat consumed
on the farm where grown, if wholly outside the scheme of regulation, would have a
substantial effect in defeating and obstructing its purpose to stimulate trade therein at
increased prices”).
101. See supra Part II.
102. 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
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In United States v. McCoy,103 Judge Stephen Trott raised in dissent the
issue of as-applied challenges. He argued that Lopez had foreclosed asapplied challenges:
My colleagues have finessed an unavoidable issue in this case: whether
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) is unconstitutional on its face. They have
attempted to restrict their holding to McCoy and to others ‘similarly
situated,’ but it is not clear to me that the law permits such a limitation. I
so conclude because McCoy’s conduct clearly falls within the language
of the statute, and because the Supreme Court appears under such
circumstances to have ruled out ‘as applied’ challenges in Commerce
Clause cases. In my view, if the conduct under review falls within the
plain language of the statute, precedent requires us to take the statute
head on, not carve pieces out of it . . .
The reason why I believe the majority's approach is not viable is simple:
the Supreme Court said in Lopez that ‘where a general regulatory statute
bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of
individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.’ . . . I
take this passage in Lopez to mean here precisely what it says: the de
minimis nexus of Rhonda McCoy’s personal activity to interstate
commerce is of ‘no consequence,’ so long as (1) her conduct falls within
the purview of the statute, as she has stipulated, and (2) the statute itself
which covers that activity is valid. The Court in Lopez articulated this
clarification to make it clear that although Congress may not use a
‘relatively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad general
regulation of state or private activities,’ if the general regulatory statute
at issue does bear a substantial relation to commerce, an ‘as applied’
challenge is inappropriate.104

In United States v. Stewart,105 Judge Alex Kozinski responded that Lopez
did not preclude as-applied challenges.
The dissent in McCoy asserted that as-applied challenges cannot be
brought under the Commerce Clause, relying on a single sentence from
Lopez for support: ‘[W]here a general regulatory statute bears a
substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual
instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.’ . . . The
McCoy dissent took this sentence entirely out of context.
Lopez itself borrowed this sentence from a footnote in Maryland v. Wirtz
. . . a case that had nothing to do with as-applied challenges, but instead
announced the so called ‘enterprise concept,’ which allows Congress to
exercise authority over a large enterprise or industry by regulating its
103. 323 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2003). McCoy was followed in United States v. Maxwell,
386 F.3d 1042 (11th Cir. 2004), which held that 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) was
unconstitutional as applied. Id. at 1063.
104. Id. at 1133-34 (Trott, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
105. 348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003).
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smaller components, even those components that bear no relation to
interstate commerce on their own. 106

Judge Kozinski further explained that all constitutional challenges are asapplied, and that they are the “basic building blocks” of constitutional
litigation:
106. Id. at 1140. Judge Kozinski’s opinion continued:
Wirtz held that Congress could regulate a group of employees who had no direct
connection to interstate commerce, reasoning that labor-related “strife disrupting an
enterprise involved in commerce may disrupt commerce,” and that “substandard
labor conditions among any group of employees, whether or not they are personally
engaged in commerce or production, may lead to strife disrupting an entire
enterprise.” The Court in Wirtz was careful to explain that, although the
employees’ activities were not themselves in interstate commerce, Congress had
reasonably determined they had a material effect on interstate commerce because
of their participation in the larger enterprise. The Court employed a similar mode
of analysis in Wickard. It held that, though Wickard's homegrown wheat may not
have traveled interstate, it had a material effect on the interstate price of wheat:
“[T]aken together with [the homegrown wheat] of many others similarly situated,”
it had an aggregate effect on commerce that was “far from trivial.”
Read in context, the sentence quoted by the McCoy dissent can only mean that,
where a general regulatory statute governs a large enterprise, it does not matter that
its components have a de minimis relation to interstate commerce on their own.
What does matter is that the components could disrupt the enterprise, and could
thus interfere with interstate commerce. In the Wirtz situation, then, the enterprise
is the mechanism through which a multitude of the intrastate effects are
consolidated and amplified so that they have an effect on interstate commerce.
This obviously has no bearing at all on a case such as ours where the activity in
question is not part of a large enterprise that itself has an effect on interstate
commerce.
Our Commerce Clause jurisprudence supports this reading. Before cases like
Wirtz, the Court drew a much sharper line between local and interstate commerce,
holding that certain activities such as production, manufacturing and mining were
exclusively the province of state governments. Cases like Wirtz and Wickard were
thus quite radical in their expansive conception of the Commerce Clause, because
they first articulated Congress's power to regulate persons and things twice and
thrice removed from interstate commerce. But this is entirely different than saying
Congress can regulate someone with no relation to interstate commerce at all—
such as a person who builds a machinegun from scratch in his garage—so long as
there is an otherwise valid statute that covers his activities. There is nothing in
Wirtz, Wickard, Lopez, or in any of our cases—not even buried in a footnote—
suggesting this understanding of the Commerce Clause is plausible. Quite the
contrary, the Supreme Court has always entertained as-applied challenges under the
Commerce Clause. In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, for example,
the Court found Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was valid “as applied . . . to
a motel which concededly serves interstate travelers.” In Katzenbach v. McClung,
the Court found the same statutory provision valid “as applied to a restaurant
annually receiving about $70,000 worth of food which has moved in commerce.”
If the dissent in McCoy were right, we would have only needed one case to say
Title II is valid, period. There would have been no need to consider—as the Court
did—whether a single hotel or restaurant had a sufficient nexus to interstate
commerce, and could thus be federally regulated. Wickard was also an as-applied
challenge: Had the Court deemed regulation of the business of agriculture a
sufficient basis for upholding the application of the Agricultural Adjustment Act to
Filburn, there would have been no need for it to analyze how his particular
activities affected interstate commerce.
Id. at 1140-42 (internal citations omitted).
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Indeed, it is hard to believe the Court would ever eliminate as-applied
challenges for one particular area of constitutional law. As Professor
Fallon explains, ‘[a]s-applied challenges are the basic building blocks of
constitutional adjudication.’ Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and
Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321,
1328 (2000). An as-applied challenge asks a court to consider whether a
statute's application to a particular litigant is a valid one. Whereas the
‘enterprise concept’ is only relevant when a party is regulated in relation
to a large industry or enterprise, whether a given statute can
constitutionally be applied to a claimant is an inquiry that occurs in every
constitutional case: In order to raise a constitutional objection to a
statute, a litigant must always assert that the statute's application to her
case violates the Constitution. But when holding that a statute cannot be
enforced against a particular litigant, a court will typically apply a
general norm or test and, in doing so, may engage in reasoning that
marks the statute as unenforceable in its totality. In a practical sense,
doctrinal tests of constitutional validity can thus produce what are
effectively facial challenges. Nonetheless, determinations that statutes
are facially invalid properly occur only as logical outgrowths of rulings
on whether statutes may be applied . . . Professor Fallon also notes that
‘[t]raditional thinking has long held that the normal if not exclusive
mode of constitutional adjudication involves an as-applied challenge.’ . .
. We therefore cannot agree with the bold assertion in the McCoy dissent
that an as-applied challenge is inapposite in cases such as this.107

In Stewart, the defendant was convicted of, among other things, five
counts of unlawful possession of a machinegun in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(o).108 In concluding that § 922(o) was unconstitutional as applied to
Stewart, the Court targeted the failure of the Government to establish
federal jurisdiction.109 The jurisdictional failure was two-fold: the lack of
a jurisdictional element in the statute,110 and the fact that the machinegun
had not traveled in or substantially affected interstate commerce.111
Other appellate courts have not directly confronted the issue of asapplied challenges the way the opinions by Judges Trott and Kozinski do.
These courts have taken various approaches to the sufficiency of
jurisdiction in federal criminal statutes. For the First Circuit, a statute with
107. Id. at 1142 (internal case citations omitted).
108. Id. at 1134.
109. Id. at 1134-42. The Stewart opinion also noted that § 922(o) failed the first and
fourth prongs of the Morrison test; that is, possession of a machinegun, without more, was
not commercial or economic in nature. Id. at 1136. Moreover, the effect of Stewart’s
possession of homemade machineguns on interstate commerce was attenuated. Id. at 1137.
110. See id. at 1138 (explaining that “section 922(o) contains no jurisdictional element
anchoring the prohibited activity to interstate commerce”).
111. Id. at 1135-36. “Notably absent from this provision is any jurisdictional
requirement that the machinegun has traveled in or substantially affected interstate
commerce.” Id. at 1134.
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a jurisdictional element is sufficiently distinguishable from Lopez and
Morrison.112 Even the lack of a jurisdictional element may not, for some
courts, invalidate the statute.113
On the other hand, the Third Circuit has indicated that a jurisdictional
element alone may not suffice.114 The Second Circuit also questioned the
sufficiency of a jurisdictional element,115 but it ultimately ruled that per
curiam circuit precedent precluded an as-applied challenge.116 In contrast,
the Eighth Circuit, citing Stewart, specifically held that a federal statute
adopted under the Commerce Clause was unconstitutional as applied.117
To this author, the question of as-applied challenges seems rather
straightforward, based on Bass118 as relied upon in Lopez.119 First, the
prosecution has the burden of proving all the elements of the crime.120 If
the statute has a jurisdictional element based on the Commerce Clause,
then the prosecution must prove that element of the case.121 If in the
particular case, as a matter of law, it is clear from undisputed facts that the
prosecution cannot prove the connection required under the Commerce
112. See United States v. Capozzi, 347 F.3d 327, 335-36 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding that the
Hobbs Act did not exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause authority because the statute
specifically “applies only to that specific subset of robberies and extortions that affect
interstate commerce”).
113. See Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding
the lack of a jurisdictional element insufficient to render the Endangered Species Act
invalid); United States v. Ali Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding
that the lack of a jurisdictional element in an anti-bootlegging statute did not render the
statute invalid).
114. See United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 473 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding the
jurisdictional element in a statute criminalizing the possession of child pornography too
attenuated to render the statute constitutional).
115. See United States v. Holston, 343 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 2003) (questioning “whether
the mere existence of jurisdictional language [in a child pornography statute] purporting to
tie criminal conduct to interstate commerce can satisfactorily establish the required
‘substantial effect’”).
116. See id. at 90 (“[W]hen Congress regulates a class of activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce, ‘[t]he fact that certain intrastate activities within this class, such
as growing marijuana solely for personal consumption, may not have a significant effect on
interstate commerce is . . . irrelevant.’”) (quoting Proyect v. United States, 101 F.3d 11, 14
(2d Cir. 1996)).
117. Klingler v. Dir. Dep’t of Revenue, 366 F.3d 614, 617 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that
the Commerce Clause did not allow Congress to use the Americans with Disabilities Act to
prevent Missouri from charging an annual fee for parking placards for the disabled).
118. 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
119. See 514 U.S. 549, 561-62 (1995) (finding the Gun-Free School Zones Act flawed
because the statute lacked the necessary jurisdictional element linking the criminalized
conduct with interstate commerce) (relying on Bass, 404 U.S. at 337, 347, 349).
120. See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979) (forbidding “criminal
conviction except upon sufficient proof—defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier
of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the offense”); In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (requiring explicitly that the prosecution prove beyond a
reasonable doubt each element of a charged crime before a defendant may be convicted).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Latouf, 132 F.3d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Because the
‘substantially affect interstate commerce’ requirement is a jurisdictional element [of a
crime], it must be proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”) (citations omitted).
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Clause, then the court should rule that the constitutionally required
jurisdiction does not exist in the particular case122—even though the statute
may be constitutional on its face.
III. FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION: AN OVERLOOKED SEPARATION OF
POWERS ISSUE
In Lopez and Morrison, the Supreme Court focused on the fact that the
statutes involved did not regulate commercial activity.123 Nevertheless, the
Court’s citations blurred the commercial-criminal distinction. In order to
explain the test under the Commerce Clause, Lopez reviewed the long line
of the landmark Commerce Clause cases—cases which generally have
nothing to do with crime.124 Lopez then looked to Perez v. United States,125
a criminal case, to describe the categories of commercial activity covered
by the Commerce Clause.126 By emphasizing Perez, the Court perpetuated
the blurring of criminal with commercial activity produced by that
precedent.
As pointed out in New Deal lawyer Robert Stern’s critique of Perez, the
great Commerce Clause cases had nothing to do with crime.127 Prior to
Perez, the Supreme Court often separated criminal cases based on the
Commerce Clause by the use of narrow statutory construction in order to
avoid the constitutional issue.128 Indeed, Bass, relied on by Lopez to
explain the case-by-case approach, was such a case. Assuming, however,
that the Court is not prepared to repudiate Perez, federal criminal cases can
still be better distinguished from commercial cases by focusing on the issue
of separation of powers between the judiciary and Congress.
In sum, federal statutes that actually regulate commerce do not require
federal courts to allow an Executive Branch department, namely the DOJ,

122. See, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238, 1246 (1st Cir. 1996) (explaining
that “if [the jurisdictional] element is not satisfied, then [the defendant] is not guilty”)
(citing United States v. Ryan, 41 F.3d 361, 363-64 (8th Cir. 1994)).
123. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (emphasizing that the criminal statute at issue has
“nothing to do with ‘commerce’”); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000)
(declining to expand the scope of the Commerce Clause to victims of violent crime because
of the non-economic nature of the regulation).
124. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553-67 (outlining the Court’s development of Commerce
Clause powers based on challenges to regulated commercial activity).
125. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
126. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (citing Perez, 402 U.S. at 150).
127. See Robert Stern, The Commerce Clause Revisited—The Federalization of
Intrastate Crime, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 271, 273 (1973) (observing in 1972 that Congress had
only just begun to assert its commerce powers “in a criminal law context”).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 350-51 (1971) (holding that a federal
statute which was unclear as to whether the criminal act must be connected with interstate
commerce must be read narrowly so as to require that a nexus with interstate commerce be
shown as an element of the offense).
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to impose repeatedly on their jurisdiction.129 Federal criminal statutes
require repeated invocations of federal court jurisdiction. Every criminal
indictment, based on a federal criminal statute, that on its face or as-applied
exceeds the power of Congress, asks a federal court to exercise jurisdiction
it lacks.130 Even if the statute is constitutional on its face, it does not follow
that the particular application is constitutional, as discussed above.131 In
non-criminal cases, the Executive Branch need not always, or even
normally, resort to a federal court in order to enforce the particular
statute.132 While the Executive Branch may use civil suits in federal courts
to enforce federal statutes, it must file criminal cases whenever it seeks to
enforce a criminal statute.133 For every criminal case, a court must get
involved, even for the overwhelming percentage of defendants who enter
guilty pleas.
The non-criminal enforcement of Commerce Clause-based statutes
generally involves the delegation of regulation by the Congress to the
Executive Branch.134 When a new statute is enacted, it may face a
constitutional challenge as to the authority of Congress to pass the
particular act.135 Once that matter is definitively settled, and assuming it is
settled in favor of Congress’s power, then the Executive Branch is the
primary actor with the role of the federal courts being generally secondary,
at most. Congress is happy to delegate to the Executive Branch, which is
generally willing to accept the delegation. The President, at the time of the
law’s enactment, accepts the delegation by signing the particular

129. See generally California v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 369 U.S. 482 (1962) (holding that
antitrust policy entrusted to the judiciary could not be frustrated by an administrative
agency); Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948)
(“Judgments within the powers vested in courts by [Article III] may not lawfully be revised,
overturned or refused faith and credit by another Department of Government.”).
130. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3.3 (6th ed.
2000) (noting that there are constitutional limitations on federal power and jurisdiction and
that Congress “should not be able to exercise its power to create exceptions to federal
jurisdiction that would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, or other
Constitutional limits”).
131. See supra Part II.
132. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(upholding a federal agency’s reasonable interpretation of its governing statute and
enforcement measures taken pursuant to such interpretation and implementing regulations).
133. The DOJ has attempted to “regulate” corporations by publicizing prosecutorial
guidelines which “encourage” adoption of “compliance programs.” John S. Baker, Jr.,
Reforming Corporations Through Threats of Federal Prosecution, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 310,
316 (2004).
134. See generally United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (discussing the
delegation of regulatory power to administrative agencies and the weight duly enacted
administrative regulations carry).
135. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) (noting that,
although Congress has the authority to override and supersede judicially created rules, such
authority does not exist where those rules are required by the Constitution).
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legislation.136 The role of the Supreme Court and other federal courts is
limited to deciding whether Congress’s legislation infringed on the powers
of the President, of the states, or on the rights of individuals.137
While federalization of crime involves the powers of Congress vis-à-vis
the states and individuals, it also involves relationships between the three
branches of the federal government. As between Congress and the federal
courts, the issue is similar in some sense to the question of as-applied
challenges, discussed above,138 in that both concern the jurisdiction of
federal courts. That discussion, however, focuses on whether the
prosecution has established that the facts of the particular case bring it
within the scope of the Commerce Clause. While similar to that issue, the
separation of powers issue involves the institutional relationship between
Congress and the federal courts.
The separation of powers issue between Congress and the federal courts
should be distinguished from what is called the delegation, or actually the
non-delegation, doctrine.139 As discussed in Mistretta v. United States,140
the non-delegation doctrine is derived from separation of powers.141 In
considering the constitutionality of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, the
majority opinion, as well as Justice Scalia’s dissent, says that Congress did
not violate the non-delegation doctrine by giving broad power to the U.S.
Sentencing Commission to establish sentences.142 However, the two
136. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3 (requiring any bill passed by both Houses of
Congress to be presented to the President for approval or veto); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 946-51 (1983) (holding that presentment is required bicameral approval of legislation).
137. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (“Due respect for the
decisions of a coordinate branch of Government demands that we invalidate a congressional
enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional
bounds.”).
138. See supra Part II (discussing as-applied challenges).
139. During the 1930s, it was common for a challenge to a new congressional statute to
involve unconstitutional delegation challenges, in addition to Commerce Clause challenges.
See, e.g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating an
administrative regulation under the non-delegation doctrine); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388 (1935) (reaching the same result). Until the last decade, neither case seemed
viable. When Lopez opened the way for challenges under the Commerce Clause, a similar
effort to revive non-delegation challenges—emerged, but was quashed—at least for now.
See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assoc., 531 U.S. 457, 472-76 (2001) (reaffirming the broad
power of Congress to delegate to the Executive Branch). These delegation cases, however,
involved only the relationship between Congress and the Executive.
140. 488 U.S. 361, 371-75 (1989) (upholding the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
established by the United States Sentencing Commission on the basis that Congress neither
delegated excessive legislative power to the Commission nor violated separation of powers
in the Commission’s design).
141. See id. at 413, 415-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
142. See id. at 374 (finding that the limited delegation of legislative power to the United
States Sentencing Commission did not violate separation of powers because it was
“sufficiently specific and detailed to meet constitutional requirements”); id. at 416 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (agreeing that Congress did not violate the non-delegation doctrine to the
extent that Congress guided the Sentencing Commission’s discretion by an “intelligible
principle”).
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opinions view the separation of powers challenge differently.143 Although
the majority rejects the separation of powers challenge, its opinion does
note “serious concerns about a disruption of the appropriate balance of
governmental power” and the placement of this “peculiar institution”
within the judiciary.144 Justice Scalia’s opinion goes further by insisting
that the U.S. Sentencing Commission violates separation of powers because
it is an entity which does nothing more than make law, as opposed to
making rules as part of some other function.145
Congress generally has little occasion to delegate power to the federal
judiciary. The major exception concerns the Rules Enabling Act,146 in
which Congress gave to the Supreme Court power to prescribe rules of
federal procedure.147 As Congress has created more federal criminal
statutes with attenuated connections to the Commerce Clause, it has in
effect delegated to the federal judiciary regulatory matters that would
otherwise be handled by an administrative agency. The lower federal
courts are creatures of Congress,148 as are administrative agencies.149
Separation of powers principles, however, prevent Congress from treating
lower federal courts like administrative agencies.150
Congress finds it convenient to enact broad legislation with minimal
detail to be filled in by administrative agencies. If the agencies are
“independent”—that is, of the Executive—Congress can more easily

143. Compare id. at 384 (suggesting that the U.S. Sentencing Commission does generate
separation of powers concerns despite its constitutionality), with id. at 420 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (insisting that the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s authority to essentially create
binding laws violates separation of powers principles).
144. Id. at 384.
145. Id. at 420-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
146. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2004) (authorizing the Supreme Court to promulgate federal
rules of practice, procedure, and evidence); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART
AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 608 (5th ed. 2003)
(noting the need for uniformity in federal rules of procedure and the effectiveness of
granting to the Supreme Court the power to create such rules).
147. See FALLON, supra note 146, at 608-19 (discussing the development of the rules
creation process over the years and concerns about the process and the role of the Supreme
Court).
148. See Sheldow v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850) (finding that courts created by
statute are limited in jurisdiction to that which the statute confers).
149. See FALLON, supra note 146, at 46-47 (stating that administrative agencies and their
adjudicatory mechanisms originate from Congress’s Article I legislative authority, not from
Article III judicial authority).
150. Congress has been able to influence the operation of administrative agencies not
only through the practice of broad delegation, but also by separating out independent
agencies. Administrative agencies within the Executive Branch are subject to the control of
the President. But see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691-93 (1988) (upholding a
congressionally imposed “good cause” limitation on the firing of an independent counsel).
The Supreme Court has allowed Congress to restrict the power of the President to remove
appointees to independent agencies. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602,
631-32 (1935) (upholding a section of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) Act which
limited the ability of the President to dismiss FTC Commissioners on policy grounds).
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pressure them.151 Even as to agencies nominally under the control of the
Executive, Congress has devices to prod the agency towards the desired
direction,152 even though its favorite tool—the Congressional veto153—has
been formally excluded as unconstitutional.154 As long as Congress can, to
some extent, control the administrative agencies, it is inclined to avoid
political accountability by being too specific in statutes.155
The actions of and threats by members of Congress with respect to
criminal sentencing reflect that Congress, or at least influential members
thereof, in some ways view the federal courts like administrative agencies.
First, Congress created the U.S. Sentencing Commission as an
“independent” agency within the judiciary, to avoid making the tough
political judgments about sentencing.156 Thus, when Congress wanted to
register its outrage over Enron and similar corporate scandals, it simply
enacted “get tough” directions to the U.S. Sentencing Commission.157
Predictably, when Congress said “jump,” the administrative agency
complied. When some members of Congress did not approve of sentences
handed down by some federal judges, they basically limited the discretion
of judges to make downward-departing judgments.158
151. See Stephen H. Yuhan, The Imperial Presidency Strikes Back: Executive Order
13,233, The National Archives, and the Capture of Presidential History, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1570, 1598-1600 (2004) (discussing the factors which contribute to an executive agency’s
independence from the Executive and Legislative branches).
152. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 130, at § 7.4 (discussing the history behind
congressional investigations of the Executive Branch and the benefits of such investigations
to the democratic process).
153. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 948-60 (1983) (striking down the one-house
legislative veto of executive decisions because it violated the principles of bicameralism and
separation of powers).
154. Id. at 959.
155. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 421 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(noting that Congress will avoid making divisive political choices when given the
opportunity).
156. See id. at 422 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“By reason of today's decision, I anticipate
that Congress will find delegation of its lawmaking powers much more attractive in the
future. If rulemaking can be entirely unrelated to the exercise of judicial or executive
powers, I foresee all manner of ‘expert’ bodies, insulated from the political process, to
which Congress will delegate various portions of its lawmaking responsibility. How
tempting to create an expert Medical Commission (mostly M.D.’s, with perhaps a few
Ph.D.’s in moral philosophy) to dispose of such thorny, ‘nowin’ political issues as the
withholding of life-support systems in federally funded hospitals, or the use of fetal tissue
for research”).
157. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 805, 116 Stat. 745, 802
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994) (distributing guidelines and policy statements to all federal
courts in order to establish clear directives concerning sentencing). As noted by the U.S.
Sentencing Commission, this section “directed the Commission to review and amend, as
appropriate, the guidelines and related policy statements to ensure that the guidelines that
apply to organizations in this chapter ‘are sufficient to deter and punish organizational
criminal misconduct.’” Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 68 Fed. Reg.
75,339, 75,358 (Nov. 1, 2004).
158. See, e.g., Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of
Children Today Act (PROTECT Act) of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650
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Congress certainly has authority to craft careful legislation which
restrains the sentencing discretion of judges.159 That is tough work,
however—work that Congress does not seem interested in doing. Rather
than doing its own job of legislating, it acts as if it is attempting to dictate
particular sentences. It can do so by providing for mandatory sentences.160
As long as Congress or the U.S. Sentencing Commission provides a range,
however, sentencing judgments must be judicial ones.161 Indeed, in
mandatory sentencing, no judicial judgment is involved. Congress could
more carefully craft the definition of crimes, which in turn could produce
more tightly graded sentencing, or Congress could adopt mandatory
sentences. Otherwise, Congress’s recourse, if it does not like a judge’s
sentencing judgments, is to impeach him or her.162 But again, that is hard
work that Congress seems uninterested in doing.163
Congress has left great discretion to the Executive in prosecution by
enacting broad and often ambiguous criminal statutes.164 For a long time,
and even still, the federal courts cooperated with prosecutors in stretching
the meaning and coverage of federal crimes. Insofar as the federal
judiciary has been compliant, the DOJ has refrained from pressuring the
judiciary through Congress. As exemplified by its reaction to the Booker
case, however, the DOJ is prepared to pressure judges who do not comply
with its view on sentencing.165 Due in large part to the fault of federal
(eliminating some judicial discretion in sentencing and requiring stronger minimum
sentences in an attempt to protect children from abduction and sexual exploitation).
159. Cf. FALLON, supra note 146, at 319-20 (noting Congress’s power to limit the
jurisdiction of federal courts).
160. See, e.g., PROTECT Act § 401 (strictly limiting downward departures from
sentences prescribed by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
161. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 759 (2005) (Breyer, J., with Rehnquist,
C.J., O’Connor, Kennedy & Ginsburg, JJ., constituting the majority as to the remedy)
(finding that the congressional policy of reducing sentencing disparities that underlies the
Sentencing Guidelines “depends for its success upon judicial efforts to determine, and to
base punishment upon, the real conduct that underlies crime of conviction”).
162. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2-3 (granting the House of Representatives the sole power
of impeachment of federal officers and the Senate the sole power to try all impeachments);
see also Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 237-38 (1993) (refusing to interfere with the
Senate’s decision to have evidence taken by a committee of the Senate rather than by the
full Senate).
163. Consider Nixon, where the Senate created a committee to “try” the impeachment of
Chief Judge Nixon, who had already been convicted of a federal crime. Nixon, 506 U.S. at
226-28. The Senate as a body was apparently not interested in spending much time in a trial
when the outcome was pre-ordained by the judge’s criminal conviction. Id.
164. See James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of
Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 10 (1994) (suggesting
there are considerable logistical and political motivations for Congress to leave many of its
bills vague and imprecise).
165. See Assistant Attorney General Christopher A. Wray, Statement Before the House
Committee on the Judiciary Concerning Federal Sentencing After Booker 6-7 (Feb. 10,
2005) [hereinafter Wray Statement] (imploring Congress to take action to prevent improper
and inconsistent factors from informing judges’ sentencing decisions), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/press_room/testimony/2005
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judges, federal prosecutors have been able to ignore the limits on
separation of powers.
The federal judiciary is at its strongest and least subject to criticism in
the defensive use of judicial review. That is, when the Supreme Court rules
that it cannot constitutionally exercise jurisdiction, it does not need the
Executive to enforce its judgment.166 Refusing jurisdiction is certainly not
an act of abandonment of its responsibilities and can serve to protect the
federal judiciary as a separate institution.167 Thus, Marbury v. Madison
established the Supreme Court’s authority by denying its power to judge
the case on the merits. Chief Justice Marshall ruled the Court could not
exercise the jurisdiction given by Congress.168 Had the result been
otherwise, namely issuing an order against Secretary of State Madison’s
efficacy, it would have depended upon enforcement by the President,
which would not have happened. The Court’s judgment in Marbury, which
did not require the President’s cooperation, protected the judiciary.169
The Supreme Court could more clearly distinguish than it has in Lopez
and Morrison between criminal and non-criminal statutes under the
Commerce Clause. It could do so by focusing on the Executive’s
continued attempts to expand federal court jurisdiction through liberal
interpretations of criminal statutes. In cases where criminal defendants
make an as-applied challenge to a statute, a federal court could explain that
the indictment exceeds the court’s jurisdiction.170 In doing so, it would not
jeopardize federal legislation insofar as it actually regulates commerce.
Rather, the Court would merely be refusing to exercise criminal
jurisdiction.171
IV. THE VIOLATION OF SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE “DETAILING” OF
DOJ ATTORNEYS TO THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Booker, which
has thrown the federal sentencing issue back to Congress, offers an
opportune occasion for considering the practice of DOJ detailing its
lawyers the Senate Judiciary Committee. Booker has created upheaval in
federal sentencing by making the mandatory sentencing guidelines only
_3785_fedSentencAfterBooker021005.pdf
166. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
167. See id. at 177.
168. Id. at 177-80.
169. See id. at 177.
170. See supra notes 118-122 and accompanying text (emphasizing that the Supreme
Court can limit the Executive’s ability to apply federal criminal law by refusing to exercise
jurisdiction where the law fails to meet constitutional requirements as applied to the
particular defendant).
171. In statutes that provide both civil and criminal penalties, only the civil penalties
would be available, assuming the statute was otherwise constitutional.

10/3/2005 1:39 PM

BAKER

570

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:545

advisory. As of this writing, the DOJ is urging Congress to act quickly and
to do so in a way that favors federal prosecutors in the balance of power as
applied to sentencing.172 The DOJ’s influence, however, extends beyond
the process described in civics books, whereby the Executive Branch
proposes legislation to particular members of Congress, who oblige by
sponsoring the legislation. The DOJ also has its own lawyers assigned to
the Senate Judiciary Committee where they draft criminal legislation.173
“Inside the beltway” it is no secret that various Executive Branch
agencies “detail” their employees to congressional committees.174 The
practice does not simply involve the Executive Branch inserting itself into
the workings of a separate branch. Prominent senators have insisted that
Executive Branch agencies supply them with more detailees and describe
the practice as “mutually beneficial.”175 When in 2003 the Office of
172. See Wray Statement, supra note 165, at 14 (urging Congress to act quickly to
prevent sentencing judges from relying on the Supreme Court’s Booker decision to impose
more lenient sentences than the guidelines require).
173. See, e.g., Suzanne Nelson, Grassley Assails Detailee Cuts, ROLL CALL, Oct. 6, 2003
(describing the practice of “detailing” in which executive staffers are seconded to
congressional offices), available at http://www.lexis.com.
174. See id. (postulating that the Office of Personnel Management’s proposed
regulations could have the “far-reaching” effect of limiting the widely-used practice of
detailing). The Office of Personnel Management’s proposed regulations would have barred
any executive agency from detailing an executive employee to the legislative branch without
first receiving the approval of the Office of Personnel Management. Detail of Government
Employees From the Executive Branch to the Legislative Branch, 68 Fed. Reg. 53,054
(Sept. 9, 2003) [hereinafter Detail of Government Employees]. Congress subsequently
rejected the proposed amendments. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No.
108-447, div. H, tit. VI, § 638, 118 Stat. 2809.
175. See 149 CONG. REC. S13120 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 2003) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I rise to speak on the amendment Senator
Domenici and I offered to address a regulation recently proposed by the Office of
Personnel Management; a regulation that is wrong-headed.
Congress and the executive agencies have long enjoyed a mutually beneficial
relationship where executive branch employees are detailed to congressional
offices. These details typically exist for 1 to 2 years.
As a result, the executive branch has an opportunity to have its employees learn
about the legislative process and oversight activities. Likewise, the legislative
branch has an opportunity to utilize the expertise of executive branch employees.
Everyone benefits.
The regulation proposed by the Office of Personnel Management will inevitably
ruin the benefits of this long-term practice.
The regulation proposed by the Office of Personnel Management for example,
seeks to reduce to 6 months the time that a detailee can spend in Congress. This is
too short a time for even the most industrious of detailees to understand the
intricacies of the legislative process and contribute to that process.
Moreover, this regulation attempts to limit the activities in which executive branch
employees can engage while under the direct supervision of a Congressional office
in an effort to micro-manage from afar. This is unacceptable.
Senator Domenici and I have offered an amendment to prohibit the use of any
funds for the implementation of this regulation that will severely reduce the
number, availability and benefit of executive branch detailees to the legislative
branch to the detriment of all.
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Personnel Management (“OPM”) proposed to limit the practice, Congress
blocked those regulations.176 To the unsophisticated “outside the beltway”
onlooker, however, the obvious question would seem to be simply this:
“Doesn’t such an arrangement violate the separation of powers between the
Legislative and Executive Branches?”177
As discussed above, the federalization of crime can involve jurisdictional
issues which threaten the separation of powers among the three branches.178
Sometimes the federal judiciary condones what should be understood as
violations of separation of powers. Thus, despite the Supreme Court’s
decisions of unconstitutionality in Lopez and Morrison, federal courts often
give expansive interpretations of federal crimes which effectively create
new criminal law when separation of powers should prevent that from
occurring.179 The current legislative process, however, also involves the
lack of separation of powers between the Executive and Legislative
Branches.180 While the public may unwittingly support the federalization
of crime, the symbiosis between the DOJ and the Senate Judiciary
Committee has driven the process.181
As Congress has attempted to wrest control of criminal law policy by
federalizing crimes and then curtailing the discretion of federal judges in
I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
The amendment (No. 1949) was agreed to.
Id. Mr. Grassley’s amendment to reject the proposed amendments was adopted.
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, div. H, tit. VI, § 638.
176. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, div. H, tit. VI, § 638. Section 638
provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds appropriated or
made available under this Act or any other appropriations Act may be used . . . to
implement the proposed regulations of the Office of Personnel Management to add
sections 300.311 through 300.316 to part 300 of title 5 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, published in the Federal Register, volume 68, number 174, on
September 9, 2003 (relating to the detail of executive branch employees to the
legislative branch).
Id.
177. The proposed regulations recognized the possibility of separation of powers
violations, as well as conflicts of interest, but nevertheless would allow detailing of
Executive Branch personnel to Congress, although on a more limited basis. See Detail of
Government Employees, supra note 174, at 53,054.
178. See supra Part III.
179. See United States v. Wiltberger, 18 N.S. (5 Wheat.), 76 (1820); see also JULIE R.
O’SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND MATERIALS 26 (2001)
(“Arguably, a central myth of federal white-collar crime jurisprudence is that there are no
‘federal common law crimes.’”). Professor O’Sullivan argues that the prohibition on
criminal common law is fundamentally based on the separation of powers. Id. Common
law making in the criminal realm implicates fundamental separation of powers questions
because it involves “a dangerous concentration of power for life tenured judges to both
propound the law and to preside over its interpretation and administration.” Id.
180. See, e.g., Detail of Government Employees, supra note 174, at 53,054.
181. See id.
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sentencing, it has generated other separation of powers issues. In
Mistretta,182 the Supreme Court rejected the separation of powers argument
that challenged the creation of the U.S. Sentencing Commission and its
location within the Judicial Branch.183 Booker, while primarily about the
right of jury trial as to every element of a crime, also involved separation of
powers. Booker did not reconsider the holding in Mistretta.184 It involved
other issues of separation of powers.185
The strange, two-part decision in Booker, with two different five-four
majorities, created a result that only Justice Ginsburg fully supported.186
The four-four split between the other justices involved separation of
powers concerns.187 The first four justices—those who ruled that
sentencing enhancements not based on jury fact-finding violated the right
to jury trial—would have otherwise left the congressional sentencing
system in place.188 They dissented, on separation of powers grounds, to the
second majority’s decision on the remedy.189 The four justices who
disagreed on the jury-trial issue, along with Justice Ginsburg, took the
position that the guidelines became merely advisory.190 In this split, the
first four gave priority to Congress on the issue of sentencing.191 The
182. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
183. Id. at 390 (“[W]e can discern no separation-of-powers impediment to the placement
of the Sentencing Commission within the Judicial Branch.”).
184. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 755 (2005) (Stevens, J., with Scalia,
Souter, Thomas & Ginsburg, JJ., constituting the majority as to the constitutional question)
(cautioning that the Court’s holding in Booker does not undermine its prior separation of
powers holdings in Mistretta). The Court explained that the decision in Mistretta “was
premised on an understanding that the Commission, rather than performing adjudicatory
functions, instead makes political and substantive decisions.” Id. The Court reasoned that
Congress’s promulgation of the sentencing guidelines, which was similar to the creation of
the federal rules of evidence, was a delegation of non-adjudicatory powers and did not
intrude on the authority of the judiciary. Id. Additionally, the Court recognized that the
U.S. Sentencing Commission, which exercised a quasi-legislative function and not an
adjudicatory function, did not violate Article III. Id.
185. See id. at 754-55 (Stevens, J., with Scalia, Souter, Thomas & Ginsburg, JJ.,
constituting the majority as to the constitutional question) (concluding that requiring
“sentencing factors to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt” would not violate
separation of powers doctrine as “an unconstitutional grant to the Sentencing Commission
of the inherently legislative power to define criminal elements”).
186. See id. at 746 (Stevens, J., with Scalia, Souter, Thomas & Ginsburg, JJ., constituting
the majority as to the constitutional question); id. at 756 (Breyer, J., with Rehnquist, C.J.,
O’Connor, Kennedy & Ginsburg, JJ., constituting the majority as to the remedy).
187. See id. at 755 (Stevens, J., with Scalia, Souter, Thomas & Ginsburg, JJ., constituting
the majority as to the constitutional question).
188. See id. (Stevens, J., with Scalia, Souter, Thomas & Ginsburg, JJ., constituting the
majority as to the constitutional question).
189. See id. (Stevens, J., with Scalia, Souter, Thomas & Ginsburg, JJ., constituting the
majority as to the constitutional question).
190. See id. at 757 (Breyer, J., with Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor, Kennedy & Ginsburg,
JJ., constituting the majority as to the remedy).
191. See id. at 751 (Stevens, J., with Scalia, Souter, Thomas & Ginsburg, JJ., constituting
the majority as to the constitutional question) (concluding that “[p]rovisions for such
enhancements of the permissible sentencing range reflected growing and wholly justified
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second four hypothesized that Congress wanted judges to have an
important role in sentencing.192
Regardless of whether it is preferable for judges to have a large role in
sentencing, it was quite implausible for Justice Breyer to contend that the
sentencing reform, which included the sentencing guidelines, embodied
such a policy.193 The supposed goal for creating the U.S. Sentencing
Commission and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines was to eliminate
disparity in sentencing.194 To do so, Congress attempted to reduce the role
of the jury by creating a system in which the sentencing judge could
enhance sentences based on facts found by the judge.195 That much might
have appeared to exalt the role of the judge. In fact, however, the
sentencing guideline system in practice forced judges to enhance
sentences.196 Congress removed sentencing discretion from both the jury
and the judge, a point Congress reinforced by adopting the Feeney
amendment as an attempt to prevent downward departures.197 Congress is
attempting, as much as it is able, to control the sentencing process and to
increase the likelihood and length of imprisonment.
The effect, if not the original goal, of sentencing reform has been to
lengthen sentences.198 Even if disparity were eliminated in federal
sentencing, however, the system created by Congress has generated a
greater disparity between sentences in federal and state courts for the same
legislative concern about the proliferation” of crime).
192. See id. at 759-60 (Breyer, J., with Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor, Kennedy & Ginsburg,
JJ., constituting the majority as to the remedy).
193. See id. (Breyer, J., with Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor, Kennedy & Ginsburg, JJ.,
constituting the majority as to the remedy).
194. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38 (1983) (asserting that sentencing disparities can be
traced directly to the considerable discretion the law affords judges and parole authorities).
See generally Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The
Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223,
228-31 (1993) (providing that the sentencing guidelines were designed to minimize the
“unwarranted disparity” in sentencing wrought by judges’ unchecked power to determine
sentencing for criminal convictions).
195. See Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311,
328-30 (2003) (emphasizing that the advent of the federal sentencing guidelines replaced a
sentencing system based on the “ideological or emotional dispositions” of judges or juries
with a mechanical system based on mathematical “grids prepared in advance by the
sentencing commissions”).
196. See Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity,
28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 161, 190 (1991) (emphasizing that under the sentencing guidelines
courts no longer retained the traditional ability to control the sentence imposed but rather
must impose the sentence the prosecutor recommends provided that reliable evidence
supports the facts).
197. See 149 CONG. REC. H2420 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (statement of Rep. Feeney)
(“[T]his amendment addresses long-standing and increasing problems of downward
departures from the Federal sentencing guidelines.”).
198. See Ian Urbina, New York’s Federal Judges Protest Sentencing Procedures, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 2003, at B1 (reporting that the Feeney amendment has upset many judges,
who argue that the amendment violates the separation of powers and forces judges to
enhance sentencing).
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crime.199 That would be an acceptable disparity if federal prosecution
reached only those offenses that primarily involved injury to a federal
interest. As is well known, however, the expansion of federal criminal law
has largely involved a duplication of state crimes.200 As federal criminal
law duplicates more state crimes, the potential for disparity clearly
escalates. The disparity in sentencing between those prosecuted in federal
versus state court for the same crime reflects the efforts of Congress and
the DOJ to take away from state legislatures, judges, and juries control of
the police power in their communities.201
The DOJ’s intrusion into the Judiciary Committee to draft federal
criminal law and sentencing policy should be seen as a clear violation of
separation of powers. The Executive controls the enormous power of
prosecution.202 In addition, the Executive can advocate before Congress to
pass laws to favor the policies it backs.203 Also, federal prosecutors can
present the judge with their views on the proper sentence for an individual
defendant.204 If, however, the DOJ was to “detail” one of its attorneys to a
district judge to work as a law clerk, it would obviously be an outrageous
violation of the criminal defendant’s rights. One might debate whether
such a situation would involve merely a conflict of interest or an actual
violation of due process. Clearly, however, such a practice would violate
separation of powers.
The fact that the DOJ details lawyers to work on the staff of the Senate
Judiciary Committee may or may not strike one as equally outrageous. If
the focus is due process, it may not seem to be outrageous because the
attorney is working on legislation, not on decisions in individual cases. At

199. See ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 27-30 (illustrating that the prison
term imposed for a federal crime is likely, on average, to be longer than the prison term
imposed for a similar state crime).
200. See id. at 7 (explaining that concerns over the increase in crime in the 1960s and
1970s pushed Congress to federalize criminal conduct that was previously left to exclusive
state regulation).
201. See id. at 14-15 (postulating that Congress’s justification for expanding federal
criminal law arises not out of the states’ structural inability to address the problem but rather
because such federal regulation is “politically popular”).
202. But see Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787, 796 (1987) (providing
that in certain circumstances prosecutorial power is not limited exclusively to the Executive
Branch).
203. See Andrew D. Goldstein, Note, What Feeney Got Right: Why Courts of Appeals
Should Review Sentencing Departures De Novo, 113 YALE L.J. 1955, 1965 (2004)
(commenting that Jamie Brown, the Acting Assistant Attorney General, in lobbying for the
Feeney Amendment, had “vastly” overstated many of the concerns of downward departures
on which the Feeney Amendment was based); see also Wray Statement, supra note 165, at 1
(urging Congress, on behalf of the executive branch, to adopt legislation that will minimize
disparity in the federal sentencing system).
204. See Heaney, supra, note 196, at 190 (underscoring that “[t]he prosecutor’s control
over the ultimate sentence increases the prosecutor’s bargaining power in the plea
negotiations”).
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least the proposed OPM regulations recognize the potential for conflicts of
interest and the separation of powers issues.205 The proposed regulations,
however, would not prevent the practice. Detailing DOJ attorneys to the
Senate Judiciary Committee, where they draft federal criminal legislation,
is no different in terms of separation of powers from detailing DOJ lawyers
to a federal district judge, where they would draft opinions for the judge.
The fact that the former does not excite outrage as much as the latter (and
why the latter would not occur) reflects that lawyers have been welleducated in matters of due process but not in the principle of separation of
powers.
As the Federalist warned, the Congress represents the most serious
threat to liberty under a democratic form of government.206 In practice, the
only effective means of preserving separation of powers and, therefore,
liberty “consists in giving to those who administer each department, the
necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist the
encroachments of the others.”207 The federal judiciary certainly has the
motives to enforce separation of powers by separating DOJ lawyers from
the staff of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Consistent with the “case and
controversy” limitation of Article II, however, the judiciary must await the
properly presented case.
CONCLUSION
As demonstrated by the ABA Task Force Report and the Federalist
Report, federal criminal law has undergone a great expansion. Regardless
of whether this expansion actually benefits the public, it carries political
benefits for members of Congress and the Executive Branch. Naturally, the
two political branches will not voluntarily forego those benefits. It is
precisely when these two branches join together to violate separation of
powers that the federal judiciary should, in appropriately presented cases,
enforce that fundamental constitutional protection of liberty. This Article
offers three possible strategies which might be employed in the appropriate
cases. First, defense attorneys might more often employ as-applied
constitutional challenges to federal crimes even if they have been held to be
facially constitutional. Then, in ruling on federalism challenges to federal
crimes, federal judges might find that such challenges can also be
explained in terms of separation of powers as an unconstitutional expansion
of federal court jurisdiction. Finally, someone with constitutional standing
205. See supra note 174 and accompanying text (highlighting the distinct separation of
powers problems raised by the practice of detailing).
206. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 334 (James Madison, John Jay, Alexander Hamilton,
writing as “Publius”) (Jacob Cooke ed. 1961).
207. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 246.
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might decide to challenge the practice of detailing Justice Department
attorneys to the Senate Judiciary Committee. Success with one or more of
these three strategies could have some impact on the relentless expansion
of federal crimes.

